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From Parsons on (cf. Parsons 1937), exegetes and critics have questioned
whether there might be continuity or rather a break in Durkheim’s intellectual
biography. Even today it is not an easy task to provide a definitive answer to this
question. Philippe Besnard (2001) recently explored once again the years of the
famous «change of orientation» in Durkheim’s thought – which Durkheim
himself assigned retrospectively to the year 1895 (cf. Durkheim 1907a: 404) – to
suggest that if the private and familiar context were considered, there are a good
numbers of elements to confirm the hypothesis of the break; on the other hand, if
we take into consideration the polemics with Gabriel Tarde, there is an important
feature which links the years before to those after the decisive year of 1895 (cf.
also Besnard 1995). According to Besnard, it is possible to condense the events of
the private context (that is, those of discontinuity) around a single date:
Cette date est celle du 11 avril 1897, dimanche des Rameaux et premier jour des vacances
de Pâques. Ce jour-là, Durkheim déménage; c’est un petit déménagement, pour la
distance: il quitte le 179 boulevard de Talence à Bordeaux pour le 218 du même boule-
vard, dans une jolie maison qui existe toujours. Mais la distance importe peu. Quand un
grand esprit déménage, ce n’est pas un petite affaire. Il faut ranger ses papiers, jeter beau-
coup de choses. Une page se tourne (Besnard 2001: 29).
Moving out as an epistemological caesura. A powerful and suggestive image,
given its capacity to connect the apparently anecdotal dimension of familiar inti-
macy to a possible «moment of radical change» of thought that would have influ-
enced the social sciences of the XXth Century. «Setting up one’s own papers»,
«getting rid of several things», « turning a page» for Durkheim means, according
to Besnard, also becoming liberated from the massive collections of juridical
statistics on suicides, so as to make room for ethnographical data. It is due to these
data, assumes Besnard, that Durkheim will finally find the way to « approach reli-
gion sociologically » (cf. Durkheim 1907a: 404). An assumption that may seem at
first sight supported by the sudden change of attitude in respect to ethnographical
data itself : while in 1895 Durkheim questions its validity (cf. Durkheim 1895a,
1895b), during 1897-98, he will put it on the same ground with the information
provided by history (cf. Durkheim 1897a, 1898a).
Along with this intriguing Besnardian reading, I would like to suggest another
one, rather contextual than textual, which aims to analyze Durkheim’s apparently
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contradictory attitude with respect to ethnography. I anticipate right away that by
taking into analysis the dispersed occasional writings which Durkheim devoted to
ethnography along his career, it is possible to elaborate a hypothesis that points
instead towards the continuity of his thought1.
Despite its much more detailed and accurate chronology, Besnard’s reading
belongs to an exegetical tradition that finds in Claude Lévi-Strauss an illustrious
forerunner. In a well known commemorative article (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1960), in
which he aimed to outline to which extent modern ethnology was indebted
towards Durkheim, Lévi-Strauss was actually among the first scholars to draw
attention to the contradictions existing between a few excerpts of the Rules of
sociological method (1895) and some statements of the preface to the Elementary
forms of religious life (1912) referring to the importance given to ethnographical
data. A time span of almost twenty years, Durkheim’s attitude was thought to have
«altered» to the point that Lévi-Strauss considered justified speaking of an actual
«conversion » to ethnography. The key element of such a transformation was indi-
cated by Lévi-Strauss through understanding the relations between ethnography
and history: while at the time of the Rules the former would be subordinated to the
latter, in 1912 « for the first time the two methods have been placed on the same
level» (Lévi-Strauss 1960: 58).
Indeed, before having expressed some doubts with respect to ethnographical
sources, Durkheim had underscored many times their basic role for sociology,
comparing them to historical documents. To convince oneself on this matter it is
enough to take a close look at the first lectures that Durkheim gave at the Faculty
of Letters at Bordeaux University, beginning with 1887/1888. In the introductory
course of his second Bordeaux lecture (1888/1889) dedicated to the family («La
famille : origines, types principaux »), Durkheim claims the necessity to eliminate
travel writings and missionary reports, documents «which are not objective
enough» (Durkheim 1888b: 18). For Durkheim, in order to be objective, a docu-
ment should make evidence of those customary and constant practices which can
be found « in those ways of acting strengthened by usage denominated customs,
law, traditions» (ibid.). Among these law, as far as it possesses «a clearly defined
form», continues Durkheim, « represents generally a much more valuable docu-
ment» while « it is indicated not to make use of traditions but cautiously since they
are somehow more indecisive and ephemeral» (ibid. : 20, italics mine). Neverthe-
less, a few lines later he affirms that when carefully established even traditions
«may provide highly useful teachings» (ibid.). And it is on this very aspect that
Durkheim focuses and on which he attempts to draw our attention. Not acciden-
tally, he adds that if Morgan had managed to reconstruct « the exogamic clan», it
was thanks to the study of the « daily greeting formulas adopted by the members
of certain families in Asia, America, and Australia» (ibid.), in other words to
ethnography. In short, while he admits that encoded sources such as law are gener-
ally more trustworthy, Durkheim wishes to stress that the information resulting
from the observation of ordinary practices among primitive peoples may also
reveal itself not only extremely useful, but even crucial for the identification of
social phenomena.
1 For a more detailed demonstration of what I argue in this paper see Zerilli (2001).
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Regarding the study of the family, Durkheim underscores in particular the
relevance « of the works produced by ethnologists [ethnologistes] and historians
on certain specific aspects of the history of the family» (Durkheim 1888b: 21),
and at the same time shows himself to be up to date with the utmost recent ethno-
graphical investigations at issue. But if the works conducted by historians and
ethnologists on specific aspects are essential, neither the former nor the latter,
notices Durkheim, are able to provide the quantitative information necessary for
studying a society as a whole. It is for this reason, especially when taking into
examination the contemporary family, that one should also rely on the statistical
information provided by demography. Hence, we have identified the « triple
source» on which Durkheim considers necessary for laying the foundations of the
sociological study of the family:
The law, the traditions as we get to know them by means of ethnography and history, and
finally the demography of the family, this is the triple source where we should turn to
seek the material of our inductions (Durkheim 1888b: 23, italics mine).
Interestingly, almost ten years before writing the preface to the Suicide,
history, ethnography and statistics are already conceived as the three « auxiliary
disciplines […] without which sociology cannot do nothing !» (Durkheim 1897a:
45, exclamation mark in the original). It should be stressed that the « traditions»
(mœurs) belong both to the field of history and ethnography, and that the latter is
opposed to the travel writings. In fact, while travel writings are considered to be
misleading, either when elaborated by an external observer or when they stick
closely to the indigenous point of view (cf. Durkheim 1888b: 18), ethnography
represents – the same way history does – a valid method to collect information,
even if it is based on the simple direct observation of primitive societies. As we
shall see further on, Durkheim will subsequently match together ethnographical
information and travel writings. In this stage, it is the other way round: on one
hand, there is ethnography, which like history is assigned the status of science
auxiliary to sociology, on the other hand, there are the witness accounts of trav-
elers and missionaries, which are regarded with skepticism.
During the inaugural lecture of the «Cours de science sociale» of the previous
year (that is, the first year of his university career), Durkheim establishes a recon-
struction of the history of sociology recalling the names of the scholars who have
brought a main contribution to its development, also indicating the directions to
be assumed for the future. When it comes to taking into analysis Comte’s contri-
bution, it is of high significance that Durkheim should contend with his forerunner
for the insufficiency of the sources used to highlight the functioning of his « three
stages» law:
Auguste Comte contented himself with briefly reviewing the main events of German-
Latin peoples, without realizing how much controversial would be establishing a law of
such importance on such a limited basis (Durkheim 1888a: 89).
The reason is that Comte, explains Durkheim, « was encouraged in this
perspective by the rudimentary stage characterizing ethnological sciences in his
time, and by his lack of interest for these disciplines» (ibid.). This statement leads
to think not only that Durkheim was at the time already cultivating a vivid interest
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for ethnological sciences, but also that he considered that those sciences had made
significant progress and hence acquired more credibility, during the time span
separated him from Comte. It does not seem exaggerated therefore, to affirm that,
for Durkheim, ethnographical sources have represented from the very beginning
of his university career a relevant source for the renewal of sociology on the
whole. From this point of view, the statements regarding the relations between
sociology and social sciences given with Paul Fauconnet in the Revue
philosophique (1903), right in the heart of the so-called ethnographical phase, are
not to be considered as the expression of a radically new season, but rather as a
reformulation of ideas previously elaborated2.
Let us now return upon the lecture dedicated to the family, and in particular, to
the third section where Durkheim addresses explicitly philosophers, historians,
and jurists in order to make them aware of the value of the sociological prospec-
tive. It is actually here, in a context defined by tough disciplinary competition (cf.
Craig 1983), that for the first time he openly approaches the puzzling issue of the
relations between history and sociology. For Durkheim, the difference between
these two disciplines is reduced substantially to the use each one makes of
comparison. While for the historian « the field of possible comparisons is
extremely limited» (Durkheim 1888b: 29), since he «confines himself most of
the time to the study of one nation alone» (ibid.), for the sociologist this field
manifestly extends since he aims explaining particular facts by comparing
multiple societies. It is true, Durkheim admits, that authors such as Fustel de
Coulanges or Summer Maine have extended the domain of their historical inves-
tigations to the study « of analogous institutions examined on the background of
different societies», but « these comparisons cannot be fruitful except for those
cases which are made on a large scale» (ibid.) This means, explains Durkheim,
that
…the lowest [social] species should not be ignored. In this way, the domestic law of
Australian or American tribes will let us better understand the ones of the Romans. But
the historian has remained by now rather alien to ethnography; he does not even go
beyond the classical peoples (Durkheim 1888b: 29, italics mine).
It is worth noting that the meaning of these remarks is basically the same of
some passages of the introduction to the first volume of L’Année sociologique3.
Furthermore, they preannounce the criticism Durkheim will address against histo-
rians in the preface to the Forms, namely their lack of interest in ethnography (cf.
2 It is worth quoting this text : «The great novelty of the [XIXth]Century  […] is the apparition of a
corpus of new subjects of study which due to the same kind of problems they were raising were
led from the very beginning to establish a series of principles and to employ methods which had
been previously ignored. It is mainly about two related sciences, anthropology or ethnography on
one hand, and the science of civilization on the other hand» (Durkheim & Fauconnet 1903: 149-
150).
3 This is the excerpt referred to by Besnard himself (2001: 30): «Fustel de Coulanges, despite his
deep knowledge of historical facts, has misunderstood the nature of the gens, as he thought it to be
nothing but an extensive agnation, as he was not taking into consideration the ethnographical
analogues of this family type. It is rather difficult to grasp, and most of all to understand the
authentic character of the Roman sacer if one does not make the connection with the Polynesian
tabu» (Durkheim 1898a: ii).
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Durkheim 1912: 9). Compared to the year when he writes these lines (remember
we are in 1888) what changes ten years later, in 1898, seems to be more his ideas
towards history (and particularly a certain kind of history) rather than his attitude
towards ethnography4. In the context of the late1880s, ethnography does not only
appear to Durkheim as an integral part of the sociological prospective, but it also
assumes the function of overcoming the too narrow limits of historical compar-
ison. Not surprisingly, only two years later in 1890, within the context of another
university course dedicated to the «physique des mœurs et du droit », Durkheim
clearly reaffirmed the central role of compared ethnography, placing it again side
by side with history and statistics :
…the methods employed by the physics of customs and of law are of two types: in the
first place there are the compared history and ethnography […]; in the second place the
compared statistics (Durkheim 1950: 5, italics mine).
The acknowledgement of ethnography’s importance, a legacy that Durkheim
inherited from Spencer (cf. Borlandi 1993: 103), should then be backdated.
According to what has been shown, rather than identifying a pre-ethnographical
phase and an ethnographical one, and asking oneself consequently how and why
did Durkheim reach to ethnography (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1960; Lukes 1992 [1973];
Vogt 1976; Lacroix 1981; Besnard 1986; Karady 1988), I argue that is more
rewarding and interesting to understand how at a certain moment of his career,
Durkheim seems to deny the value he had once recognized to ethnography. Some
traces of this apparent rethinking may be found in the writings of the early 1890s.
Since his first book the Division of labour in society (1893), Durkheim dwells
upon the difference of status between written sources and sources deriving from
the simple observations of customs, underscoring the higher reliability of the
former (Durkheim 1893: 109). Two years later in the Rules (1895), he reaffirms
that ethnographical information cannot have but a secondary role with regard to
historical sources (Durkheim 1895c: 132). Taken as such, these statements have
been interpreted as a warning to distrust ethnographical sources, or as an invita-
tion to assign them all the more a complementary function. Once reset in their
context, they appear more as a polemical stance against the interpretations of
those sociologists who have been « preoccupied to merge documents rather than
to criticize and select them» (ibid.). We should ask to which authors did Durkheim
make reference in these lines.
Steven Lukes (cf. Lukes 1992 [1973]: 302-313) and subsequently Philippe
Besnard himself (cf. Besnard 1995) have pointed out that the scholar absorbing
Durkheim’s polemical energies between 1893 and 1897 is especially Gabriel
Tarde, and this for various reasons, either theoretical or related to professional
considerations. Nonetheless, besides Tarde there are certainly other scholars as
well, two of whom are of particular interest here: Edvard A. Westermarck and
Charles Letourneau. To them Durkheim addresses critical pages the same year
when the Rules was published as a book. In a long review in the Revue
philosophique, Durkheim submits Westermarck’s The history of human marriage
4 On the abundant existing literature on Durkheim’s complicated and changing relations with
history (and with historians), see at least Besnard (1986) and Steiner (1995).
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(London, 1891), (the French translation of which had been recently published as
L’origine du mariage dans l’espèce humaine, Paris, 1895) to a detailed critical
analysis. The main evidence Durkheim places before Westermarck is of a method-
ological nature and takes a close look to ethnography: Durkheim criticizes him, in
fact, for having employed an « essentially ethnographical and psychological
method» and for having neglected the historical sources, while « it is only by
connecting ethnographical facts to historical facts that it is possible to eliminate
the ambiguity of the former» (Durkheim 1895b: 74). Durkheim addresses similar
objections to Letourneau in the article «Lo stato attuale degli studi sociologici in
Francia», also published in 1895 in the journal directed by F.S. Nitti and L. Roux
La riforma sociale. In this important text originally published in Italian,
Durkheim offers an outline of major French sociological trends and identifies
three main groups: the anthropological (or ethnographical), the criminological,
and the university (cf. Durkheim 1895a). It is the first group that he attributes
Letourneau, whom he criticizes, as in the lecture on family (cf. Durkheim
1888b: 20-21), for having always avoided to submit the selection of his own
materials to a harsh criticism. On the other hand, affirms Durkheim, « the trav-
elers’ descriptions are the source to which [Letourneau] abundantly resorts»
(Durkheim 1895a: 77).
It should be remarked that for the first time, in the criticism against both West-
ermarck (cf. Durkheim 1895b: 71) and Letourneau, Durkheim seems to settle
travel writings and ethnographical data at the same level. While he had posited a
clear distinction between them in the past, contesting the value of the former and
admitting the interest of the latter, now the two types of sources at least partially
overlap. Is it really a reconsideration, a simple confusion, or is it rather a strategic
option in order to bring stronger arguments to his dissension regarding the
perspectives of these authors that makes Durkheim doubt of the contribution
ethnography may bring to sociology ? First, it should be recognized that under no
circumstance, neither in the Rules, nor in the objections addressed to Westermarck
and Letourneau, Durkheim completely denies the utility of ethnographical
sources (« no fact can be neglected by the scholar», Durkheim 1895c: 132).
Second, in this context he underlines rather that they are less useful than history,
and that in any case they should not be taken separately from the latter (« these two
sources of information cannot be consulted separately », Durkheim 1895b: 74). It
is clear then that the main objection has a methodological character and refers to
the indiscriminate use of ethnography; more precisely, Durkheim contests the
absence of a critical analysis of the sources (this refers mostly to Letourneau), and
the idea that it is sufficient to multiply the number of examples in order to reach
conclusions of scientific interest and value, avoiding misinterpretations (and this
refers mostly to Westermarck)5.
5
«Mister Westermack considers that the quantity of information may compensate the mediocre
quality […] We, on the contrary, believe that in sociology, as in other sciences, the quantity of the
data is of secondary importance […] What matters most of all, is having demonstrative facts
established carefully, crucial ones, as Bacon would say, even if they are not numerous»
(Durkheim 1895b: 72-73). A principle, this one, which in the Rules takes the name of «authentic
experimental method », which « tends rather to substitute to common facts – which are convincing
only on condition that they be numerous, and hence that they only permitted to draw always
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Of course, Durkheim’s criticism is much richer and articulated with respect to
what can be mentioned here, and refers to various other specific aspects of the
works taken into examination. His criticism actually faces two very different
authors, as different are the leading objections which Durkheim casts against
them: to Westermarck he contends specifically the thesis of the substantial unifor-
mity of marriage forms in time, and the notion of marriage itself (cf. Durkheim
1895b: 78-80), while in the case of Letourneau he criticizes specifically the ideo-
logical character of his scientific perspective, which after all determines and
explains his frequent recourse to information which cannot be easily verified (cf.
Durkheim 1895a: 78). But actually there is at least one point with respect to which
these two authors may be compared according to Durkheim: while preserving
their peculiar research interests, they both systematically establish a direct associ-
ation between primitive peoples and the psycho-organic (biological) level. As for
Westermarck, Durkheim considers :
To admit that ethnographical documents in order to be understood, need to be re-
conducted to man’s primitive nature, and that the latter may even be reconstructed
according to what we know on animal upper species, would mean admitting as an incon-
testable axiom that our physical constitution, and even our animal nature, namely that
part of us which most immediately depends on the organic conditions, is the main source
of social life (Durkheim 1895b: 72).
On the other hand says Durkheim, Letourneau, in order to remain « faithful to
the spirit of the anthropological school» does not give up establishing correlation
between « social institutions» and « various human races, following their evolu-
tion in time» (Durkheim 1895a: 77). In other terms, referring in last instance to
hypothesis borrowed from natural history and evolutionary theory in order to
explain social facts, both Westermarck and Letourneau were undermining the
very basis of the durkheimian epistemological project, that claimed autonomy and
scientific legitimacy for sociology and affirming the chief « rule» according to
which «a social phenomenon cannot be reproduced unless by another social
phenomenon» (Durkheim 1895a: 101, italics in the original)6. Relying largely on
ethnographical sources and sharing a similar concept of ethnography, Westermark
and Letourneau were instead reintroducing organic and psychological factors
among the primary causes of social facts7.
While Durkheim’s criticism of Westermarck is familiar, it is not widely known
that Westermarck responded to Durkheim’s objections. Interestingly, his answer
doubtful conclusions – decisive or crucial facts, as Bacon would say, which taken individually,
and independently of their number have a scientific value and interest» (Durkheim 1895c: 79).
On Durkheim’s « experimental reasoning» see Berthelot (1995: 19-73).
6 Principle clearly stated since the first Bordeaux lecture: « social facts cannot be entirely explained
if not by other social facts» (Durkheim 1888a: 92).
7 In his L’évolution du mariage et de la famille, Letourneau wrote: « Human societies have been too
much studied as if man was a special being in the universe». This « received opinion » continues
the quotation, « explains such a late rise of anthropological sociology. A deeper knowledge of
biological sciences and of lower races has finally rescued us from this childish vanity. In this way,
we have been finally able to place mankind to its authentic place within the organic universe of
our small globe» (Letourneau 1888: 2, italics mine). Within this perspective, ethnography repre-
sents the legitimate basis of anthropological sociology (see also Letourneau 1880).
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appears in a review article published by the Revue internationale de sociologie
discussing the work of J. Kohler on the method of prehistorical research (cf. West-
ermarck 1897). This is an important text for it helps us to better understand how,
behind the polemics concerning the nature of sociological explanation, also lays a
radically different idea of what ethnography is and how it can be used.
After having acknowledged to Durkheim that in order to certify the « primi-
tiveness» of any social practice it is necessary to put historical and ethnographical
data on the same level, Westermarck indicates where such «primitiveness»
should be looked for in case these data were missing:
The problem is to know how can we acquire an amount of information in case history
were silent, and in this case it is not only ethnography, but biology and psychology as
well that should come and rescue us (Westermarck 1897: 452, italics mine).
For Westermarck, as for Letourneau, ethnography is hence called to « fill in
the gaps of history » (Letourneau [1881-1889]: 1014). Conceptualized as the
study of primitive populations, ethnography was seen as a sort of bridge linking
history on one hand, and biological and psychological sciences on the other.
When history is not able to provide satisfying answers, it is necessary, Wester-
marck argues, to resort to ethnography, and then to biology and psychology.
Moreover, for Westermarck each of these disciplines are not a separate field of
inquiry, they are instead related to each other within the natural history of man.
This perspective leads Westermarck to bring forth in his answer a crucial point of
the polemics, namely Darwin’s theory of evolution. If for Durkheim it represents
nothing else but a simple « hypothesis », and as such it may not stand for the
foundation of sociology (cf. Durkehim 1895b: 73), for Westermarck it consti-
tutes a scientifically certified fact with powerful implications for sociology as
well. Westermarck’s adhesion to Darwin’s theory leads him to mock Durkheim
and even to ask whether it is worth having a confrontation with him. Durkheim’s
objection, Westermarck writes,
…should sound strange for anyone who is at least a little aware of the huge progress
biology have accomplished on the Darwinism base. And I have to admit that I find it
difficult to enter into a polemic with an author who thinks ‘contrary to any good method’
the assumption which considers man as descending from an animal of lower species
(Westermarck 1897: 452).
Durkheim’s reply is included in a long and famous (cf. Lowie 1937: 197)
review of Koeler’s same work reviewed by Westermarck, which appeared in the
first volume of L’Année sociologique, that is almost three years later (cf.
Durkheim 1898b). Contrary to Westermarck, Durkheim restates the idea
according to which kinship and marriage are facts of an eminently social nature,
and should be interpreted as such. Moreover, in this text Durkheim challenges
Westermarck’s attacks assimilating his perspective to «common sense»:
Westermarck, voicing Starcke, while refuting Morgan’s thesis he admits that nomencla-
tures terms correspond to a social kinship relation, which he opposes to natural kinship
relation. Yet, each family relation is a social one, since it consists basically of juridical
and moral relations, sanctioned by the society. It is either a social relation or nothing else.
If Westermarck has made this distinction it is because for him, as for common sense,
authentic kinship is consanguinity and just expresses it. But when one get rid of this
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confusion, there is nothing else but a kinship: the one acknowledged as such by the
society » (Durkheim 1898b: 113).
If one takes into consideration the criticism to which the Rules have been
subjected to when they were written (cf. Berthelot 1995: 121-141; Paoletti 1995),
one realizes that the principle of the autonomy of social facts – far from being
unanimously acknowledged – was contested even at the core of the sociological
field itself. Particularly, it was contested by sociologists influenced by organicist
theories, a group well represented by René Worms who was at the time one of the
most active scholars promoting the institutionalization of sociology (cf. Geiger
1981). Even if he had never been mentioned, it is against Worms that point the
initial pages of Durkheim’s article on sociological studies in France that appeared
in La riforma sociale. Worms himself, already internationally acknowledged at
the time « as a warm apostle of sociology in Europe» (Fiamingo 1896: 341), had
collaborated to the Italian journal with an article published in the first volume,
dedicated to the teaching of social sciences within French universities. In
this article, he was foreseeing the creation of autonomous faculties of social
sciences that would have been independent from the faculties of letters or law, and
where sociology was making considerable efforts to be acclaimed (cf. Worms
1894). When Durkheim evocates « particularly restless spirits» and raises doubts
as for the necessity of establishing sociology chairs in each university (cf.
Durkheim 1895a: 74), he is in fact opposing the reformation of the university
system suggested by Worms in the columns of La Riforma Sociale. In the same
paragraph, the polemical reference regarding the « premature publication » of a
sociological journal (ibid.), makes without doubt allusion to the creation of the
Revue internationale de sociologie founded (since 1893) and edited by Worms
himself, an author for whom Durkheim had, so to say, poor scientific considera-
tion8.
Gabriel Tarde, who also collaborated periodically to Worms’ journal, is surely
the most dreaded antagonist, therefore Durkheim’s favorite target9. Nevertheless,
one should consider the fact that in the changing sociological context of the late
1890s there were a good number of other groups and tendencies which Durkheim
considers he had to face openly. While at the time of the first Bordeaux lectures he
particularly strived so that sociology should be accepted and acknowledged, now
he attempts to impose his own sociological conception. The scholars who at the
beginning of his career could have been perceived as simple interlocutors, even as
allies in order to fight a common battle for the legitimacy of a new field of study
that, « especially within the context of the university milieu […] was subject to a
8 Invited to collaborate to the Revue internationale de sociologie, in June 1894 Durkheim writes
these lines to his nephew Marcel Mauss: « It is Worms’ jester reputation that estranges me from
this journal, and most of all I cannot collaborate with a journal the director of which owns no
scientific title […], Worms’ thesis has been rejected at the Sorbonne, an affront that is not inflicted
to many » (Durkheim 1998: 35-36).
9 In the same Italian article, the severe criticism against the Tardian theory of imitation is to be read
also considering a brief text the jurist Maurice Hauriou had published in a previous fascicle of La
riforma sociale, in which he had stigmatized « the socialist tendency» imputed to the Division,
and appreciated in contrast the Lois de l’imitation of Tarde, praised as « the most terrible demol-
isher of positivism» (cf. Hauriou 1894: 633, 636).
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veritable process of discredit » (Durkheim 1895a: 73), are now seen as potential
adversaries, more or less dangerous. Among these, Letourneau is the main repre-
sentative of a scientific orientation (namely the ethnographical or the anthropo-
logical) to which Durkheim is now prepared to firmly oppose. On the other hand,
Westermarck is already an internationally well-known scholar whose reputation is
sustained in France by the sociological group positioned close to Worms’ circle
and institutions10.
In order to develop their thesis, we have seen that both Westermarck and
Letourneau largely rely on ethnography, a discipline which can be hardly consid-
ered a neutral source. Along with archeological, somatic (anthropometric and
especially craniometric), and linguistic data, ethnographical data had been tradi-
tionally a domain in which the theories of anthropologists confronted each other,
either to support or to deny the hypothesis of the multiple origin of human races
(cf. Blanckaert 1981). Particularly in the late XIXth Century French scientific
context, ethnography constitutes a research field strongly influenced by the natu-
ralist anthropological tradition (cf. Zerilli 1998: 1-25). Durkheim’s article in
Italian mostly mentioned, as well as various excerpts and an entire chapter of the
Suicide (cf. Durkheim 1897b: 108-132), suggest that he was aware of this inti-
mate and problematic relation between ethnography and anthropology, the latter
being conceived as the natural history of man11. At the moment when Durkheim
takes position against Letourneau’s « anthropological sociology» and rejects « the
considerations that M. Westermarck borrows from natural history» (Durkheim
1895b: 80) he is referring to this historically well established tie. In this context,
subordinating the value of ethnographical sources to historical data, specifically
means restating the distinctive character of « social facts», and at the same time
rejecting organic explanations widespread mostly within the anthropological (i.e.
racial) scientific milieu.
To conclude, in order to understand the criticism against Westermarck and
Letourneau, when Durkheim brings forth his utmost severe objections towards
ethnographical sources, one should keep in mind the fact that ethnography, far
from being an autonomous and independent field of study, is an auxiliary disci-
pline which is used by scholars belonging to various research traditions with
respect to their scientific objectives and purposes. In particular, the recourse to
ethnography by the representatives of naturalist anthropological tradition has
largely contributed in disseminating the idea that primitives identify with human
«state of nature», assigning an ambiguous status to the ethnography of the time:
that of a field of study located between history and natural sciences. Moreover,
10 The same year of the publishing of the French translation of Westermarck’s The history of human
marriage, the Revue internationale de sociologie was anticipating an entire chapter of the book
(cf. Westermarck 1895). Also, to the extensive and detailed Durkheim’s critical appreciation (cf.
Durkheim 1895b) compare the brief and extremely laudatory review of Westermarck’s book
signed by the journal’s editor (cf. Worms 1895).
11 It is worth mentioning that the French translation of the article appeared in La riforma sociale (cf.
Durkheim 1895a, French translation 1975) introduces a slight inaccuracy when translating
«gruppo antropologico o etnografico» by « groupe anthropologique et ethnographique» (italics
mine). No need to say, that the link or even the identification between ethnography and anthro-
pology on which this paper insisted is manifest in the original text.
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research hypothesis elaborated within the naturalist anthropological tradition, like
those assigning to ethnography the task of bringing light on human nature from
the somatic point of view, were not unfamiliar to Durkheim’s competitors in the
sociological domain. This is clear, for instance, if we look at the definition of the
term ethnography given by Worms: «ethnography defines the type of race, deals
with the study of the population and of the various grouping systems of the indi-
viduals» (Worms 1893: 448, italics mine). In 1895, the durkheimian recall to the
supremacy of history over ethnography is a way of reaffirming and defending the
thesis of the autonomy of social facts. In this context, Durkheim’s apparent skep-
ticism towards ethnographical data should be interpreted as a denial to inquire
complicated and unresolved issues to which it symbolically alludes (the organic
composition of races and their potential influence on social facts), rather than a
reference to the difficulties of studying primitives by way of direct observation, a
problem of which Durkheim was also increasingly aware. Furthermore, if we
consider that – as with Tarde – Westermarck and Letourneau were assiduous
collaborators of Worms’ journal, being at the same time actively involved in the
activities of his international sociological association, the criticism addressed
against them also evokes the institutional difficulties and weakness of
durkheimian sociology during the years preceding the foundation of L’Année
sociologique, as outlined by Philippe Besnard himself with sober lucidity (cf.
Besnard 1979, 1998).
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